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Abstract. The present essay discusses the recently adopted Act on Anti-Discrimination and the 
current and future system of disability rights protection mechanisms in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  
 Partly as a response to the atrocities of World War II, partly as a return to pre-war period, 
both East- and West-Germany adopted extensive disability-related protection mechanisms. The 
laws currently in force are following this tradition making the system of German disability 
rights one of the most progressive in Europe. Several pieces of legislation ensure rehabilitation 
and participation of disabled persons, moreover Germany’s constitution has been amended, so 
that disability is included among the prohibited grounds of the clause on non-discrimination.  
 Most recently, Germany should have implemented the European Union’s Framework Direc-
tive the scope of which extends to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability in 
employment matters. Germany, traditionally so cautious about human rights issues, transposed 
the Directive with a two-year-delay. The paper scrutinizes the implementing national law and 
explores the reasons for its numerous failures and the way towards adoption. Various legal and 
constitutional issues, among others on third party effect, freedom and equality had been 
brought up in the debate around transposition that had not been addressed at the time the 
German disability-related laws had been adopted. 
 The study of these controversies around implementation of the EU Directive is a unique 
opportunity to shed some light on the underlying constitutional issues of anti-discrimination 
laws–not only in Germany, but in all Member States of the Union which implemented the 
Directive without any public, political or legal debates.  
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In Germany political and religious considerations concerning the care for disabled 
persons can be traced back to the 15th century. The roots of contemporary German 
disability-related legislation are rooted in Bismarck’s social security system and 
in the idea to protect war veterans. This post-war protection has been extended 
to more and more disabled persons until a general approach has been adopted: 
disability rights as we know them today, are guaranteed irrespectively of the 
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cause of disability. During the horrors of World War II many disabled individuals 
became victims of the Nazi ideology. Partly as a response to these atrocities, 
partly as a return to pre-war period, both East- and West-Germany adopted 
extensive disability-related protection mechanisms. The laws now in force are 
following this tradition making the system of German disability rights one of 
the most progressive one in Europe. A single title of the Social Code is devoted 
to the rights of disabled persons,1 while the general equality of disabled is 
ensured by a separate act.2 The Basic Law, Germany’s constitution has been 
amended, so that disability is included among the prohibited grounds of the 
clause on non-discrimination.3 Most recently, Germany should have implemented 
the European Union’s Framework Directive the scope of which extends to the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability in employment matters. 
After having scrutinized the German pieces of legislation, one can conclude 
that as to disability–and here I refer to disability only, and I am not dealing 
with other protected grounds listed in the EU piece of legislation, such as religion, 
belief, age or sexual orientation–the Directive has almost been implemented in 
its entirety. Nevertheless, it is worth looking at the implementing national bill 
and discuss its failure, since many legal and constitutional issues are brought 
up that had not been discussed at the time the German disability-related laws 
had been adopted. The study of the controversies may shed some light on the 
underlying constitutional issues–not only in Germany, but in all Member States 
of the Union which implemented the Directive without any public, political or 
legal debates.  
 The anti-discrimination law raises the same issue as the EU Directive: is it 
conceivable to regulate discriminations on the basis of the different characteristics 
in a single piece of legislation? The EU differentiates somewhat between the 
prohibited grounds, but the degree of protection came closer in recent years. 
The free movement rights presuppose that there is no differentiation whatso-
ever on grounds of nationality. Whereas previously gender seemed to follow 
nationality among the most protected characteristics, now race and ethnicity 
are said to replace the leading role of gender. At the bottom of the hierarchy 
are the characteristics listed in the Framework Directive, which only extends to 
  
 1 Title IX of the Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch IX) on the Rehabilitation and Partici-
pation of Disabled People entered into force on July 1, 2001. 
 2 The Equal Opportunities for People with Disabilities Act (Behindertengleich-
stellungsgesetz) entered into force on May 1, 2002. 
 3 Article 3 Section (3) has been amended by Sentence [2] in 1994: “Persons may not 
be discriminated against because of their disability.” 
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employment matters. The German implementing legislation is comprehensive, 
since it incorporates the prohibited grounds listed in the diverse Directives. 
Since however the nature of discrimination based on different grounds are 
entirely different, the rules cannot take the different needs into account, they 
are necessarily general. Whereas for example differentiation on the basis of sexual 
orientation is in most of the cases a result of unjustified negative attitudes 
against gays and lesbians, discriminations on the basis of disability may serve 
a legitimate objective and might be permissible. As to disabled individuals, the 
German solution is beneficial, since the protection of disabled persons is 
detailed and tailor made in federal laws other than the anti-discrimination law.  
 The theoretical issues at the heart of the German debate touch the boundaries 
of the third party effect. The EU pieces of laws have been adopted without any 
further considerations on the horizontal effect of the Directive: it applies to 
both public and private entities, i.e. it is also applicable for relations between 
private persons. In the European Union states can either make difference in the 
implementing legislation, or the distinction to make is left to the judiciary. 
According to the German tradition justices decide on the horizontality of basic 
rights and also on equality. In the disability-related part of the Social Code, just 
like the draft implementing law the legislators decided on the matter by excluding 
the judiciary. The horizontality of basic rights is said to limit individual freedom, 
therefore the controversy whether equality and freedom are mutually exclusive 
will also be addressed. 
 The German legislation combines a substantive equality-based approach, 
both striving to achieve equality of opportunities, equality of result, and a social 
rights based approach. Social assistance however depends on the income, it 
can only be granted to the needy. In the current disability discourse there is 
less emphasis on social rights, which corresponds to the shift from the medical 
to the social model of disability. The medical model located the problem in the 
disabled individual, whereas the social “concept indicated the close connection 
between the limitation experienced by individuals with disabilities, the design 
and structure of their environments and the attitude of the general population.”4 
Whereas the medical model calls for social benefits, the social concept intends 
to modify the environment and to integrate disabled persons, therefore the 
emphasis on the equality concept. Despite the claimed adherence to the social 
model, the medical model heavily influences the German legislation, especially 
  
 4 United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons 
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when it comes to the definition of disability and the determination of the degree 
of impairment. 
 In the following I will discuss the legal and political considerations behind 
the German law implementing the EU anti-discrimination Directives. In the first 
part of the paper I summarize the European imperatives in the filed of equality 
that are applicable to people living with disabilities; in the second and third 
parts I will give an insight into the German attempts to comply with the European 
imperatives. In the fourth part of the present essay I summarize the theoretical 
considerations that might have prevented the German law from being adopted, 
such as the consequences of a hierarchy of equality, the effects of Drittwirkung, 
and the underlying clashes between freedom and equality. In the fifth part of 
the paper I will address the legal consequences of non-implementation, whereas in 
the conclusion I engage in forcasting the future of the German anti-discrimi-
nation legislation.  
 
 
1. European Imperatives 
 
A Council Directive of 2004, one of 2002 and two Council Directives of 2000 
address the issue of discrimination at EU level. Council Directive 2004/113/EC 
implemented the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the 
access to and supply of goods and services (hereinafter referred to as the “Gender 
Goods and Services Directive”), Directive 2002/73/EC amended Directive 
76/207/EEC on equal pay for equal work for women and men in employment 
matters (hereinafter referred to as the “Gender Directive”). Council Directive 
2000/43/EC of June 29, 2000, implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (hereinafter referred to as 
the “Race Directive”) and the Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 
2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation (hereinafter referred to as the “Framework Directive”) both 
deal with non-discrimination measures. The latter lists disability as a prohibited 
ground on the basis of which direct or indirect discrimination, instruction to 
discriminate or harassment are impermissible. All Member States should have 
implemented the Directive by May 1, 2004. As of September 2005 Germany and 
Luxemburg, furthermore Austria at regional level, and in respect of Finland, 
the Åland Islands failed to transpose the Directives.5 The German government 
  
 5 Cormack, J.–Bell, M.: Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU 
Member States compared. Belgium and the Netherlands, 2005. 13. 
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was striving to transpose the EU laws, however failed to adopt the Act which 
would have implemented the EU Directive’s provisions. The German Bundes-
länder, which should also implement the law, are waiting for the federal 
legislator to act.  
 The EU Directives set the basic principles and the framework rules, and 
following from the nature of a Directive, set the objectives each Member State 
should achieve individually through implementation. The Directives leave wide 
discretion to the Member States as to transposition. Apart from non-implemen-
tation, several other kinds of national approaches can be traced. Some Member 
States incompletely transpose the Directives picking the elements they prefer 
and excluding those that are controversial in their society. Others copy the 
Directives word by word into their national law, which is problematic, since the 
details are deliberately left to the individual Member States by the EU Directives; 
failing to regulate these details leaves an unjustifiably wide responsibility to 
the courts in interpreting the vague provisions. Finally, there are states that 
went beyond the prerequisites of EU law and afforded greater protection to the 
covered groups than necessary according to the acquis communautaire.6  
 
2. German Implementation 
 
Towards the end of 2001 the parliamentary factions of SPD (German Social 
Democratic Party) and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Green Party) drafted a 
law which would have implemented the gender-related and Race and the 
Framework Directives together in a comprehensive way. This corresponded 
to Point IX.10. of the Coalition Agreement of October 20, 1998.7 In its first 
  
 6 Mark Bell differentiates between five possible approaches on the side of Member 
States: non-implementation, incomplete implementation, incorrect implementation, paper 
implementation, and innovation and implementation. Presentation at a seminar conducted 
in the framework of the Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination: The Fight 
Against Discrimination: The Equal Treatment Directives of 2000. Trier, 28–29 November 
2005. 
 7 “Die neue Bundesregierung will Minderheiten schützen und ihre Gleichberechtigung 
und gesellschaftliche Teilhabe erreichen. Niemand darf wegen seiner Behinderung, Herkunft, 
Hautfarbe, ethnischer Zugehörigkeit oder sexueller Orientierung als Schwuler oder Lesbe 
diskriminiert werden. Dazu werden wir ein Gesetz gegen Diskriminierung und zur Förderung 
der Gleichbehandlung (u.a. mit der Einführung des Rechtsinstituts der eingetragenen 
Lebenspartnerschaft mit Rechten und Pflichten) auf den Weg bringen. Die Empfehlungen 
des Europäischen Parlaments zur Gleichberechtigung von Lesben und Schwulen werden 
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official form, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, then Minister of Justice presented the 
draft law. The proposal was however much broader in scope than the EU 
Directives would have required. Comparing the scope of the Race and Frame-
work Directives it becomes visible that the former is much broader. Sometimes 
this notion is referred to as the “hierarchy of equality”.8 In gender issues there 
are a great number of pieces of legislation to achieve equal treatment and an 
extensive case-law of the European Court of Justice is backing it up. As to race 
an ethnicity the scope of protection is still wide, however less broad than in 
case of sex. Finally the characteristics listed in the Framework Directive since 
the document’s entry into force also enjoy some protection against discrimi-
nation, however the material scope of the law is narrower, and a number of 
explicit exceptions are granted. The EU Directives require implementation in 
the field of general contract law as regards discrimination on the basis of 
sex, race and ethnic origin. As to the other grounds, implementation is only 
necessary in employment and related fields, such as vocational training and 
education.  
 The result of a common implementation of the pieces of EU legislation was 
that the drafters elevated the level of protection as regards religion, belief, 
disability, age and sexual orientation regulated by the Framework Directive to 
contracts, to the supply of goods and services offered to the public, i.e. to the 
level of protection granted by the Race and Gender Directives, which are way 
beyond the scope of the former. 
 The first draft of the German law intended to insert a new subtitle, Subtitle 
5 to Section 3 Title 1 BGB on the creation, subject matter and termination of 
contractual obligations [Articles 319 a)–e)]. Article 319 a) would have prohibited 
any discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, sex, religion or belief, sexual 
identity, age or disability in the conclusion, content or termination of a contract 
offered to the public concluded in the field of occupation, education or health-
                                                      
berücksichtigt.” [„The new Federal Government wants to protect minorities and to achieve 
their equal rights and social participation. Nobody may be discriminated against on the basis 
of his or her disability, origin, skin color, ethnic origin or sexual orientation as gay or a 
lesbian. In addition we will draft a law against discrimination and for the promotion of 
equal treatment (among others with the introduction of the legal notion of registered life 
partnership that encompasses rights and obligations). The recommendations of the 
European Parliament regarding the equal rights of lesbians and gays will be considered.”] 
http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/de/koalo/09.htm#ix10 
 8 E.g. Waddington, L.: The new equality Directives – mixed blessings, in Costello, 
C.–Barry, E. (Eds.): Equality in Diversity, The New Equality Directives. Dublin, 2003. 39–
54; Borillo, D.: Lutter contre les discriminations. Paris, 2003. 
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care. The prerequisite “offered to the public” means that the rule has to extend 
beyond private relations. With the Framework Directive in line, Articles 319 
a) and 319 b) prohibited any direct or indirect discrimination, harassment or 
instruction to discriminate. Article 319 d) dealt with exclusively private relations 
(with the exception of labor law). It took account of the fact that the ban on 
discrimination cannot be as absolute as in case of public contracts. It allowed 
for the balancing of private interests to some extent, and as an exception allowed 
for discrimination in case of certain professions. An explicit exception referred 
to age and disability in case there was a genuine and determinative occupational 
requirement that prevented handicapped persons, or people under or above a 
certain age to take the job. Further, according to the draft discrimination did 
not occur, if there is a reasonable purpose (sachlicher Grund) for the differential 
treatment of persons having the listed characteristics. Such reasonable purposes 
relevant for disabled persons were especially the avoidance of dangers, prevention 
of damage or other purposes of comparable kind; the protection of privacy or 
personal security; if different treatment was designed to grant special advantages 
and an interest in the penetration of equal treatment was missing; and finally in 
case of private insurance companies’ statistical risk evaluation (however, here 
potential pregnancy is excluded as a justifiable reason for differentiation). In 
line with the Framework Directive and similarly to Article 611 Section (1) 
BGB on the prohibition of gender-based discrimination in case of employment 
contracts, the new Article 319 c) allowed for the partial reversal of the burden 
of proof with the aim to enhance discriminated persons’ chances to litigate a 
case. According to this provision the persons protected only had to make the 
facts which indicated that discrimination had occurred, plausible (glaubhaft 
machen). The other party to the case was to bear the burden of proving that 
his or her decision, action had been unrelated to the applicant’s protected 
characteristic. The opponents of the modification argued that negative evidence, 
in this case the lack of discriminatory intentions, is very difficult to be proven.9 
Indeed, this criticism has been voiced in relation to the mentioned EU Directive 
as well. An employer has to use objective tests when interviewing applicants 
for a position, and he or she can only take the job-related characteristics into 
account. However, in order to prove at a possible later litigation that no 
discrimination occurred, employers first have to ask questions in writing, or 
record an oral interview and second, they must keep these documents and 
  
 9 Ladeur, K.-H.: The German Proposal of an „Anti-Discrimination”-Law: Anticonsti-
tutional and Anti-Common Sense. A Response to Nicola Vennemann. German Law 
Journal, 2002. 
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records so as to be able to prove at a later point in time that a rejected applicant 
has not been discriminated against. This might be especially burdensome for 
smaller companies where the method of interviewing is rather informal, oral 
and where the recording and storing of data is problematic. It has also been 
pointed out that these procedural rules “only touch the stupid”,10 as it is fairly 
easy to overcome the provisions and to use more sophisticated filters for screening 
out disabled, if someone really intends to do so. It has been predicted that 
employers will find a way out from the legal obligations, and the whole legal 
system will be weakened by this forced dishonesty.11 Again others reminded to 
the disadvantages in living under a permanent threat for being suspicious of 
discriminatory behavior. Once the fact of discrimination has been established, it 
may have two kinds of consequences according to Article 319 e). First, when-
ever relevant, the court may oblige the discriminator to refrain from such 
behavior in the future, and second the court may order the employer to treat the 
applicant in a non-discriminating manner and to undo the consequences of 
discrimination. (Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch) This can also lead to the modifi-
cation of the employment contract. Should the employer already have concluded 
a contract with someone by the time the discrimination has been proven, this 
contract cannot be contested, but instead compensation can be asked.12 The 
same rule applies in case of one-time occasions.13 The new rules on granting 
the possibility for associations and other legal persons to represent discriminated 
individuals reflected Article 9 of the Framework Directive. Victims of discrimi-
nation could have assigned their claims for compensation to associations. These 
NGOs would have had the possibility to represent persons discriminated in 
court proceedings, where representation was allowed by persons other than 
attorneys. The procedural rules have partially repeated the wording of Article 
63 SGB IX extending this rule to discrimination based on other grounds as 
well. A difference in the Verbandsklagerecht regulated by SGB IX and the 
proposed anti-discrimination act is that the latter allowed for representation of 
the discriminated person, even in lack of his or her authorization. It has been 
criticized as being a too far reaching position, driven by the “impulse to fulfill 
  
 10 Ibid. 
 11 Picker, E.: Anti-Discrimination as a Program of Private Law? German Law Journal, 
2003. 778; Ladeur: op. cit. 9. 
 12 The compensation requirement is also subject to many criticisms, because of the 
high possibility of abuse. See e.g. Picker: op. cit. 776. 
 13 Vennemann, N.: The German Draft Legislation on the Prevention of Discrimination 
in the Private Sector. German Law Journal, 2002. 
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a German ‘Übersoll’”,14 however technically it is difficult to imagine a scenario 
where a legal person litigates against the injured party’s will without his or her 
cooperation. In the rare cases when it happens however, associations should 
consider whether bringing a case to the court in the absence of the victim’s 
wish would be beneficial or detrimental for him or her. As to discrimination 
based on disability, the SGB IX as lex specialis compared to the proposed anti-
discrimination legislation, would prevail over the latter.  
 The bill has been redrafted several times until the Bundestag adopted it on 
June 17, 2005. The Bundesrat voted against the law on July 8, 2005 with the 
argument that the proposed act was unreasonably wide, and violated private 
autonomy.15 The issue was promised to be brought up again in the new, 16th 
election period. The coalitions agreement between the SPD and CDU/CSU 
took the implementation of the anti-discrimination Directives for granted despite 
all disagreements.16 
 The initial draft has been changed both in structure and in content. Whereas 
the first version intended to amend the BGB, the later bill was drafted as a 
separate federal act initially named Act on Anti-discrimination [(Gesetz zum 
Schutz vor Diskriminierung (Antidiskriminierungsgesetz, ADG)].17 In the last 
version of the bill the title has been changed to General Equal Treatment Act 
(Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG). Finally, the act has been adopted 
in August, 2006. The aim of the law is to prevent or eliminate negative dis-
crimination (Benachteiligung) on the basis of race, ethnic origin, sex, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual identity.18 The German legislature adopted 
parallelly a separate law on anti-discrimination of soldiers. (Gesetz zum Schutz 
der Soldatinnen und Soldaten vor Diskriminierung, SADG)  
 In the meanwhile since the first steps of the implementation process, two 
more laws have been adopted by the EU legislators, so the recent versions of 
  
 14 Picker: op. cit. 776. 
 15 Unterrichtung durch den Bundesrat Gesetz zur Umsetzung europäischer Antidiskri-
minierungsrichtlinien: Anrufung des Vermittlungsausschusses – Drucksachen 15/4538, 
15/5717. 
 16 Die EU-Gleichbehandlungsrichtlinien werden in deutsches Recht umgesetzt. [The 
EU Equal Treatment Directives will be implemented into German law.] Point 2.3. of Title 
VII. The Agreement mentions the social laws in favor of disabled persons, their social 
participation and the need for the promotion of parasport. http://koalitionsvertrag.spd. 
de/servlet/PB/show/1645854/111105_Koalitionsvertrag.pdf 
 17 Gesetzentwurf Drucksache 15/4538 Deutscher Bundestag, December 16, 2004. 
http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/045/1504538.pdf 
 18 Article 1 AGG. 
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both the general anti-discrimination law and its twin sister, the law protecting 
soldiers transplant the Gender Goods and Services Directive, the Gender 
Directive, the Race Directive and the Framework Directive. 
 The scope of this general anti-discrimination law is, similarly to the previous 
one, much wider than the EU Directives would have required. It extends to 
employment in the broad sense of the word, i.e. including self employment, 
access to employment, promotion, benefits, work conditions, dismissal, vocational 
training, promotion, dismissal, educational training, employment advice, involve-
ment in trade unions, etc.; social protection, social advantages, education, 
access to goods and services available to the public, including housing.19 The 
law consists of different parts, separately regulating labor law,20 and modifying 
contract law.21  
 As to employment it is to be noted that sheltered workshops are not included, 
the draft only refers to traditional labor relations. The definition of discrimination 
corresponds to the definitions in the Directives. Direct, indirect discrimination, 
harassment and instruction to discriminate are included. Exceptions that the 
EU Directives allow are also granted in the implementing law. Indirect discrimi-
nation does not occur in case of a different treatment, if objective reasons 
justify it. There is an express exception granted to religious organizations, 
where belief might be a determinative factor,22 and special exceptions are allowed 
on the basis of age.23 Once a violation occurred, the employer has to compensate 
for material and immaterial damages.24 Similarly to the previous solution, 
these also have to be paid in case the person having been discriminated against 
also has a right to compensation in cases he would not have been employed even 
if discrimination had not occurred. As opposed to the first draft, victimization 
is only mentioned in labor relations, but not in reference to general civil law. It 
has been pointed out that this is not necessarily a detriment, since most cases 
of victimization seem to be covered by the general rules of contract law, and in 
some cases even criminal law protection is granted.25  
  
 19 Article 2 Section (1) Points 1–8. AGG. 
 20 Abschnitt 2, Schutz der Beschäftigten vor Benachteiligung.  
 21 Abschnitt 3, Schutz vor Benachteiligung im Zivilrechtsverkehr.  
 22 Article 9 AGG. 
 23 Article 10 AGG. 
 24 Article 15 AGG. 
 25 Mahlmann, M.: Prospects of German Antidiscrimination Law. Transnational Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 2005. 1045. 
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 The second part of the Act on general contract law invoked more criticisms. 
This is the field where German legislation went far beyond than what is 
required by EU law, which only obliges Member States to respect the principle 
of non-discrimination as regards sex, race and ethnic origin in this field. Never-
theless, the German legislator extended the protection to contract law to persons 
having other characteristics listed in the Framework Directive. However, this 
protection of persons having the protected characteristics only applies to such 
contracts that are typically concluded with a large number of partners in large 
number of cases of comparable nature (Massengeschäfte, mass businesses), 
and where the identity of the contractual partner is of minor importance.26 This 
formulation seems to exclude the much debated topic of housing, unless a 
company or a private person is involved in the business of renting flats, 
apartments, houses or hotel rooms. To make it more explicit, due to the public 
outcry and the opposition from the legal profession concerning housing, a 
specific exception has been granted for cases where there is a special relation 
and trust between the parties. As to the grounds listed in the Framework 
Directive including disability this exception is permissible, however as to race 
and ethnic origin, the exception is clearly in violation of the Race Directive. 
The only provision that could save the German clause is in Recital 3 Race 
Directive stating that it is „also important, in the context of the access to and 
provision of goods and services, to respect the protection of private and family 
life and transactions carried out”, however in the actual body of the law such 
reference cannot be found; according to Article 3 the Directive applies to 
“all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public 
bodies”. The EU legislator could have opted for inserting an exception into the 
provision on the scope of the Directive, if intended to do so, just like in the 
case of the Gender Goods and Services Directive, which is according to its 
Article 3 only applicable to persons providing goods and services available to the 
public, “and which are offered outside the area of private and family life.” The 
drafters of the Race Directive in contrast did not grant any such exceptions in 
the actual body of the law, therefore the German law’s respective provision 
seems to be in violation of the acquis communautaire. As it has been shown, 
it is also against common sense and basic morals, since strictly interpreted, it 
would allow for the hanging of a sign “Rooms for rent – except for Jews”, if 
the person letting the room lived in the same house,27 although it would 
certainly contradict the general clauses of the BGB.  
  
 26 Article 20 AGG. 
 27 Mahlmann: op. cit. 1045. 
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 Partly as a result of compromise, a number of other exceptions are granted 
in the second and final version, too. First, contracts in the field of family law 
are exempted. Second, an objective reason may justify differentiation on the 
grounds of religion, belief, disability, age, sexual identity or sex.28 Third, the 
prevention of dangers and damages may justify difference in treatment. Fourth, 
the protection of privacy or intimacy may be a ground for justifiable differen-
tiation. Fifth, special advantages may be granted to groups of persons, if the 
interest to enforce equal treatment is lacking. Sixth, religious communities may 
attach importance to the belief of individuals. Seventh, insurance companies are 
exempted from the scope of the law as well, in case if the protected characteristic 
is a determining factor as to the subject of the contract and it is underpinned 
by statistical data. (However, just like in the first draft, pregnancy-related 
concerns cannot justify different treatment.)29  
 The procedural rules have not been amended as compared to the previous 
bill; they are taken over from the Directives. The Act expressly states that rules 
on the representation of disabled persons, i.e. Article 63 SGB IX are not 
effected.30 A novelty is the establishment of the Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Agency (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes) functioning at the Federal 
Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth.31 The Bundes-
präsident(in) appoints the person directing the Agency at the suggestion of 
the federal government.32 The Agency receives complaints, supports persons 
submitting complaints, assists counseling by other bodies, promotes mediation, 
takes measures of prevention, every four years reports to the federal govern-
ment and the Bundestag and makes recommendations.33 The Agency has to 
enter into dialogue with NGOs and other responsible bodies, and in order to 
promote this cooperation it has to create an advisory body of independent 
experts in the field.34 
 According to a later draft the unified anti-discrimination code would have 
been called “Act on the Implementation of European Directives for the Reali-
zation of the Principle of Equal Treatment” (Gesetz zur Umsetzung europäischer 
  
 28 Article 21 of the bill. 
 29 Article 21 Points 1–5. of the bill. 
 30 Article 25 Section (5) of the bill; also see the explanatory note attached to the 
provision. 
 31 Article 26 of the bill. 
 32 Article 27 of the bill. 
 33 Article 28 of the bill. 
 34 Articles 30–31 of the bill. 
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Richtlinien zur Verwirklichung des Grundsatzes der Gleichbehandlung). In 
Article 1 one could have found the actual Act on the Protection against discrimi-
nation. (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz), Article 2 would have contained 
the Act on the Protection of Soldiers against Discrimination (Gesetz zum Schutz 
der Soldatinnen und Soldaten vor Diskriminierungen), Article 3 had modified 
a number of other laws and Article 4 disposed of the entry into force.  
 The final version came into being with the title General Equal Treatment 
Act (Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG) and has been adopted 
simoultaneously with the separate law on anti-discrimination of soldiers. 
(Gesetz zum Schutz der Soldatinnen und Soldaten vor Diskriminierung, SADG) 
The legislator opted for the word “Benachteiligung” (disadvantaging) instead 
of “Diskrimination” (discrimination) in order to emphasize that not all kinds of 
different treatment are of a discriminatory character. The exemption of 
churches has been extended;35 victims of discrimination can sue within three 
months from the point in time they got to know about the discrimination; the 
victim of discrimination cannot claim from the court that a contract shall be 
concluded with him or her (no Kontrahierungszwang); in contrast to the 
previous draft, victims cannot assign their pecuniary claims for damages to 
NGOs, and NGOs may not represent cases independently from the victim. 
 The first reading of the bill should have taken place on May 19, 2006, but it 
has been postponed to June, 2006. Finally, it has been adopted on 14 August 
2006, and entered into force four days later. 
 
 
3. Political Debate around Implementation 
 
Previous comments and the heated debate indicated from early on that it will 
be difficult to reach a compromise. The draft law for the implementation of EU 
anti-discrimination provisions has been called an “attempt against the basics of 
the republic.”36 Volker Kauder, then CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union 
of Germany/Christian Social Union) federal faction whip formulated this 
objection even more explicitly: “Previously we have been told, it depends on 
the ‘proper race’. Later, in the GDR the ‘proper class’ has been propagated, later 
  
 35 Religious organizations irrespectively of their legal form and facilities associated 
with them may discriminate on the basis of religion. Article 9 of the new bill. 
 36 “Anschlag auf die Grundzüge dieser Republikcc. Quoted from Forum gegen Rassismus, 
Arbeitsgruppe Gleichbehandlung, Info-Brief Nr. 6 März 2005. Bundesministerium des Innern, 
Ref. IS 3. 
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it has been a matter of the proper skin color. ‘And now we experience: one has 
to take the proper political stand’. Should this not help, an anti-discrimination 
law will be drafted.”37 Many others expressed their worries that the law “desires 
in its regulating furor, to replace the free individual with the ‘good’ one”,38 i.e. 
that government will be transformed into a moral enforcing agent suppressing 
liberty and diversity.39 
 In this particular case freedom of private employers, churches, landlords 
were confronted with the equality of those who are having one or more of 
the characteristics listed in the Directives. Private employers criticized the 
bill as one limiting private autonomy. Churches, particularly the Christian 
ones expressed their worries that they cannot exclude persons in the future 
who would contradict their teachings, if they had at the same time a protected 
characteristic.  
 Some voice bureaucratization concerns, saying that as a result of the 
reversal of the burden of proof, all sellers and service providers will have to 
store evidence to show that they have not discriminated against potential buyers, 
consumers. Other criticisms refer to the difficulties in differentiating between 
permissible and prohibited differentiations, the additional burden on the judiciary 
as a result of the flood of anti-discrimination cases, the irrational limitation of 
the market economy, and preference for certain minorities over family and 
children. 
 Mainly small- and middle-size companies voiced their worries about 
unnecessary bureaucratization, which is understandable since recording and 
storing evidence for a potential later case might be a disproportionate burden on 
them. Another reason for the silence of multinational companies is that most of 
them already adopted anti-discrimination programs following the international 
trend.  
 The forces favoring the law are lobby groups and entities of civil society 
pushing for the rights of women or disabled people. In the political arena the 
  
 37 “Früher hätten die einen gesagt, es komme auf die ‘richtige Rasse’ an. Später in 
der DDR sei die ‘richtige Klasse’ propagiert worden, dann sei es um die richtige Hautfarbe 
gegangen. ‘Und jetzt erleben wir: Es muss einer die korrekte politische Einstellung haben.’ 
Wenn das nicht helfe, werde ein Antidiskriminierungsgesetz gemacht.” Forum gegen 
Rassismus, Arbeitsgruppe Gleichbehandlung, Info-Brief Nr. 6 März 2005. Bundesministerium 
des Innern, Ref. IS 5. 
 38 Picker: op. cit. 784. 
 39 E.g. Adomeit, K.: Diskriminierung – Inflation eines. Begriffs. Neue juristische. 
Wochenschrift, 2002. 1622–1623, Ladeur: op. cit.   
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drafters, i.e. the green party and the social democrats pushed for the adoption 
of the law. They emphasized that the ease of the burden of proof existed for 25 
years in Article 611 a) BGB in relation to gender-based discrimination. They 
also stressed the responsibility of Germany as a Member State to implement 
the Directives that the Germans also voted in favor of.  
 It has also been pointed out that it was embarrassing to ask prospective 
Member States to comply with human rights and to adjust their legal systems 
according to the acquis communautaire, whereas a founding Member State does 
not respect its obligations under EC law in the filed of anti-discrimination. 
 According to some observers the reason for the failure of the Directives’ 
implementation can be explained by the fact that civil society has not been 
loud enough, as NGOs traditionally pursuing strong lobbying activities in the 
field of human rights did not doubt that implementation will occur.40 
 
 
4.  Theoretical Debate around Implementation 
 
4.1. Hierarchy of Equality 
 
The German law implementing the four anti-discrimination-related EU Directives 
reject the hierarchy of equality that is typical for the acquis communautaire, 
i.e. the national law rejects the idea of the diverse levels of protection and the 
different scope of application of the anti-discrimination Directives.  
 The uniform domestic rules resulted in difficulties and prevented the 
implementing law from adoption for a long time. The protection of disability 
and other grounds in the Framework Directive have been elevated to the level 
of protection the Race Directive granted for race and ethnic origin. Apart from 
an eagerness and ambition of post-World-War-II Germany to be the leading 
Member State when it comes to the protection of human rights, there might be 
some constitutional considerations behind the common regulation.  
 According to a constitutional principle one cannot differentiate between the 
protected grounds laid down in Article 3 Section (3) Basic Law. Accordingly 
the legislator is obliged to find a common solution. Disability might however 
be an exception to this principle, since the Basic Law only prohibits negative 
differentiation of disabled persons, however does not mention the prohibition 
of favoring them, as in case of the other protected grounds.  
  
 40 Ibid. 
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 In spite of the constitutional obligation to treat all persons with any protected 
characteristic the same way and to grant them the same rights, laws do differ 
on a lower level, since equality of persons with certain characteristics need 
legislation of different nature than others. In order for the laws to be effective, 
the reasons for differentiation have to be identified, and they have to be over-
come in suitable ways. Whereas it is almost impossible to find any possible 
scenario where direct age discrimination may be justified,41 differentiation 
on the basis of disability might be legitimate in a number of cases, like the 
protection of consumers, fellow employees, just to mention a few.  
 The advantage of the absence of a hierarchy of equality is that the victim 
of discrimination does not have to search for his or her most protected 
characteristic to win a case. Human beings fall into different subgroups at 
the same time: they are men or women, hetero- or homosexuals, religious or 
non-religious persons, young or old, disabled or able-bodied and–minded. As 
Susanne Baer pointed out, everyone who has been discriminated against shall 
be able to make a case irrespectively of the grounds on the basis of which the 
victim has been disadvantaged.42  
 
4.2. Drittwirkung 
 
Based on Article 1 Section (3) Basic Law fundamental rights apply in the 
relation of the individual versus the state. As opposed to this verticality, 
Drittwirkung, or the third party effect doctrine would mean that the funda-
mental rights of a constitution, in this case the Basic Law are applicable in 
horizontal, i.e. private relations. A direct third party effect (unmittelbare 
Drittwirkung) has not been foreseen by the Basic Law. The arguments against 
it are manifold. First, denial of horizontal effect can be derived from the text 
of the above mentioned Article 1 Section (3), which expressly states that the 
Basic Law’s fundamental rights “bind the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary as directly enforceable law.” Second, as Hermann von Mangoldt, 
then representative of Parliament pointed out, the drafters of the Basic Law 
  
 41 It is possible to think of many indirect age discrimination cases; for example when a 
certain physical strength is necessitated for the job, aged persons may be excluded; in 
contrast if the position requires experience, this may lead to the screening out of young 
applicants.  
 42 Baer, S.: Kultur am Sonntagmorgen: EU als Gesetzgeber, Antidiskriminierungs-
gesetzgebung und europäische Rechtskultur, aired on radio Deutschlandfunk, at 9:30 a.m. 
on September 11, 2005. (Audio record on file with author.) 
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intended to guarantee basic rights in the classical sense, i.e. the founders of the 
constitution wanted to “regulate the relation between the individual and the 
state by setting limits to the exercise of state power, so that humans’ dignity 
remains inviolable.”43 Third, following a systemic interpretation, one can find 
certain provision in the Basic Law that expressly extend to horizontal agree-
ments, therefore one can conclude a contrario that in all cases there is no such 
extension in scope, the provision in question, i.e. the majority of fundamental 
rights does not apply in private relations.44 Fourth, when engaging into a 
teleological interpretation, one cannot assume that the primary aim of the Basic 
Law is to limit the freedoms of private persons, which would be the result of a 
general direct third party effect.45 
 As it has been shown, vertical effect of fundamental rights is not subject to 
dispute, Article 3 Section (3) [2] Basic Law on the prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on disability is directly binding on the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers. However it is also applicable in private relations, though to a 
limited extent. Although basic rights do not have a direct third party effect, they 
are applicable in private relations through the indirect (mittelbare) Drittwirkung 
doctrine.  
 The underlying idea behind the general applicability of rights can also be 
derived from the Basic Law itself. According to Article 1 Section (2) human 
rights are “the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.” 
The third party effect is also justified by the argument that in contemporary 
societies it is not only the state that may abuse power and restrict the rights 
of individuals, but employers, economic entities may also do so.46 Therefore 
  
 43 „Vielmehr sahen die Beteiligten ihre Aufgabe darin, die Grundrechte im Sinne der 
alten klassischen Grundrechte zu gestalten. […] In den Grundrechten sollte also das 
Verhältnis des Einzelnen zum Staate geregelt werden, der Allmacht des Staates Schranken 
gesetzt werden, damit der Mensch in seiner Würde wieder anerkannt werde.” Parlamen-
tarischer Rat, Bonn 1948/49, Annex to the stenographic report of the May 9. 1949 session. 
Written memorandum of Dr. von Mangoldt on Part I on Basic Rights. Reproduced at 
http://www.gewaltenteilung.de/grundrechte.htm. 
 44 Such as Article 9 Section (3) for example, banning private agreements impairing the 
right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions. 
 45 Pierroth, B.–Schlink, B.: Grundrechte. Staatsrecht II. Heidelberg, 2005. 44, Rn. 
174–175. 
 46 Ibid. 176. 
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private entities that may also stand in vertical power relation to individuals, 
shall not be exempted from basic rights scrutiny.47  
 The justification of the original fear behind the concept of vertical effect, 
i.e. that the state is likely to abuse power to the detriment of individuals, has 
also been called into question. Through social and economic rights the state 
has been burdened by positive obligations, and it has to provide appropriate 
procedures and resources for the realization of these rights. Freedom, as German 
scholar Ulrich Preuß put it “does not only imply freedom from the state but 
also requires institutional devices that allow the realization of freedom through 
the state.”48 (emphasis in original) As the vertical nature of private relations, 
such as those between employers and employees, and the state support systems 
show, the lines between horizontal and vertical Drittwirkung are blurred, 
especially in the German Federal Republic, where the constitution guarantees 
that Germany be a social state.49  
 The German Federal Constitutional Court dealt with the fundamental issue 
of third party effect in a very early case carving out the borders of free 
speech.50 In the Lüth case the Court first emphasized the objective order of 
values in the Basic Law centering upon dignity and the free development of 
personality influencing all fields of law, be it public or private. The Court then 
rejected an unlimited horizontal application of fundamental rights in private 
relations propagated in earlier cases by the Federal Labor Court, but held that 
“[t]he legal content of basic rights as objective norms is developed within 
private law through the medium of the legal provisions directly applicable to 
this area of the law. […] A dispute between private individuals concerning rights 
and duties emanating from provisions of private law–provisions influenced 
by the basic rights–remains substantively and procedurally a private law 
dispute […] The influence of the scale of values of the basic rights affects 
particularly those provisions of private law that contain mandatory rules of law 
and thus form part of the ordre public […] In bringing this influence to bear, 
the courts may invoke the general clauses which, like Article 826 of the Civil 
Code, refer to standards outside private law. “Good morals” is one such 
  
 47 Sommeregger, G.: The Horizontalization of Equality, in Sajó, A.–Uitz, R. (Eds.): 
The Constitution in Private Relations: Expanding Constitutionalism, Utrecht, 2005. 41. 
 48 Preuß, U.: The German Drittwirkung Doctrine, in Sajó–Uitz (Eds.): op. cit. 29. 
 49 Article 20 Section (1) Basic Law: „The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic 
and social federal state.” This provision is even protected by the Article 79 Section (3), the 
eternity clause of the Basic Law, i.e. it cannot be amended. 
 50 Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958). 
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standard.”51 Ultimately courts, i.e. public institutions are deciding private 
disputes. The judicial power, together with the executive and the legislative, is 
directly bound by basic rights as declared by Article 1 Section (3) Basic Law. 
The German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that courts deciding on 
private law matters have to interpret civil law in line with fundamental rights.  
 Basic rights do not directly effect private relations, but certainly influence 
them. The rights contained in the Basic Law do not solve civil law disputes 
concretely, but find complete expression through the rules dominating the given 
branch of law.52 Like basic rights in general, Article 3 (3) [2] also radiates 
through an indirect third party effect (Drittwirkung) into private relations 
through the civil law’s general clauses (Generalklauseln).53 These are contained 
among others in Article 826 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
BGB)54 and refer to the concept of good faith, public morals, public order 
(sittenwidrige vorsätzliche Schädigung). Courts interpret these clauses in light 
and in conformity with fundamental righs. According to their historical 
understanding, industrial societies set the conditions for freedom and equality, 
which presuppose a factual symmetry, according to which all persons have the 
same rights to act according to their interests and to enforce these.55 This factual 
symmetry is today compromised by both the state and by private entities. The 
Basic Law itself establishes an imbalance when protecting property and the 
right to conclude contracts; further the legislative power is entitled to construct 
asymmetric relations, as long as privileges are not created and some persons 
are not placed in a helpless or defenseless situation.56 
 The notion of third party effect, Drittwirkung, is at the center of the German 
debate preventing the anti-discrimination law from being adopted. Many German 
legal scholars argue that there should be a differentiation between prosecution 
of discrimination in the public arena and intrusion into private relations. It has 
been contended that the new law extensively regulating the private sphere is 
unconstitutional, foreign to the liberal tradition of the BGB and against common 
sense.57 Some see the enforcement of equality as the limitation of private 
  
 51 Translation is cited from Kommers, D. P.: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Durham and London, 1997. 363. 
 52 Pierroth–Schlink: op. cit. 181. 
 53 Heun, W. in Dreier, H. (ed.): Grundgesetz, Vol. I, Tübingen, 2000. Article 3. Rn. 123. 
 54 See also Articles 138 on contracts contra bonos mores and 249 BGB on Treu und 
Glauben, i.e. bona fide. 
 55 Heun: op. cit. Article 3. Rn. 139. 
 56 Pierroth–Schlink: op. cit. 183. 
 57 E.g. Ladeur: op. cit. 
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autonomy by curtailing the general liberty to choose.58 They contend that 
autonomous choice, a possibility to distinguish without any justification or 
reasoning, according to one’s irrational choice or taste, is the basis of private law, 
which has now been curtailed. Others see the law as the peak of a continuous 
development of German law since the World War II. They emphasize that the 
law does not intend to prohibit discriminatory thoughts, but only discrimi-
natory actions.59  
 Whereas in the previous discussion of the notion of third party effect, I 
dealt with the role of the judiciary, anti-discrimination laws raise a different 
problem. It is the legislative power that prescribes the horizontal application 
of Drittwirkung obligatory. Therefore some writers differentiate between three 
kinds of horizontalities: direct horizontality, indirect third party effect, and 
Drittwirkung prescribed by the legislative.60 
 At the heart of the German debate on Drittwirkung is a provision of the 
Race Directive. According to Article 3 Section (1) h) „Within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon the Community, [the Race] Directive shall apply to 
all persons, as regards, both the public and private sectors, including public 
bodies, in relation to […] access to and supply of goods and services which are 
available to the public, including housing.” The reference to supply of goods 
and services offered to the public are missing from the Framework Directive. 
Nevertheless the German Act extends the protection of all protected groups 
having the characteristics listed in both the Race Directive and the Framework 
Directive to goods and services offered to the public and housing. It should 
also be noted at the same time that the interpretation of the term ‘offered to 
the public’ is left to the Member States. Of course not all offers to the public 
can be meant. A repeatedly invoked example is the newspaper advertisement 
listing the desired characteristics of the preferred future partner.61 In such a 
personal issue legal prohibition of discrimination against persons with certain–
  
 58 Sommeregger, G.: The Horizontalization of Equality, in Sajó–Uitz (Eds.): op. cit. 46. 
 59 Winkler, V.: The Planned German Anti-Discrimination Act: Legal Vandalism? A 
Response to Karl-Heinz Ladeur. German Law Journal, 2002. Winkler rejects all three 
assumption by Ladeur, i.e. that the draft was unconstitutional, against common sense and 
also opposes the deeply rooted belief that the BGB was liberal. He thinks its a myth since 
Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff first said so in her writing: Die Grundrechte als Abwehrrechte. 
Baden-Baden, 1988.  
 60 Sommeregger: op. cit. 34. 
 61 Schöbener, B.–Stork, F.: Anti-Diskriminierungsregelungen der Europäischen Union 
im Zivilrecht – zur Bedeutung der Vertragsfreiheit und des Rechts auf Privatleben, 
Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien, 2004. 60. 
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even protected–characteristics would be contrary to common sense. It is a 
widely accepted principle that the more a law intrudes into the private sphere, 
the more flexible it should be towards arbitrary differential treatment.62 In line 
with the principle, private and family relations are currently not covered. 
Recital 4 of the Race Directive reinforces that “[i]t is important to respect such 
fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of association. 
It is also important, in the context of the access to and provision of goods and 
services, to respect the protection of private and family life and transactions 
carried out in this context.” Many contend however that contractual freedom in 
general, and not only in the very intimate sphere would be impaired and be 
against common sense, once screened though anti-discrimination laws.  
 
 
4.3. Freedom versus Equality 
 
There have been some attempts to compare the Directives to the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States instead to submit them to national 
scrutiny. Affected rights of potentially discriminating persons, respected by the 
European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as: ECJ) have been identified. 
The two main rights are the right to property and contractual freedom, and the 
right to private life, privacy. Article 16 of the not yet binding Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, the case-law of the ECJ,63 the right to conclude contracts as 
derived from Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR on the right to property have been 
invoked in relation to the former. As to the latter aspect, Article 7 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, the case-law of the ECJ64 and Article 8 ECHR have 
been named. Authors arrived to the same conclusion that has also been reached 
in the evaluation of the Act on the basis of already existing national laws: 
elevation of equality cannot mean the reduction of freedom of others, since in 
a situation the law tries to prevent, the person having specific characteristics 
would be pushed out of the market. They would remain unprotected and would 
only have a formal declaration to a right to conclude contracts.65 Furthermore 
it shall be borne in mind that the ECJ also protects equality as a general 
principle of law, not only freedom of contract and private life. Articles 20 and 
  
 62 Ibid. 66. 
 63 Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-334/00 Tacconi [2002] ECR I-7357. 
 64 Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-2575; Case C-404/92 X. v 
Commission [1994] ECR I-4737. 
 65 Schöbener–Stork: op. cit.  61. 
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21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on general equality and equality 
before the law, Articles 22–25 of the Charter on cultural rights, equality 
between men and women, rights of children, of the elderly, and of persons with 
disability, Article 13 EC Treaty, Article 14 ECHR, or Article 1 of Protocol 12 
ECHR can be named. Elevated to this level, a collision of general principles of 
laws can be declared.  
 Freedom, mostly freedom of contract and equality are opposed also in the 
German debate.66 This is an old controversy that comes up from time to time in 
Germany in many fields. As it has been pointed out in the framework of 
constitutional law, the political demand to ensure as wide societal freedom as 
possible collides with the wish to ensure as much equality as possible. Societal 
freedom is freedom of the strong, whereas societal equality is the equality of the 
weak. As opposed to the social constriction of the conflict, the constitutional 
protection of these two values peacefully cotton. The constitutional provisions 
protecting equality and freedom leave a wide margin of appreciation to the 
legislative power by only setting the borders.67  
 The legislative previously used to ensure equality before the law, equality 
in relation to the state and the individual, and equality in private relations 
through the general clauses of the BGB. It was up to the judge to fill the general 
clauses and interpret them in light of fundamental rights. Through the adoption 
of anti-discrimination legislation the room left to the judiciary shrank and the 
legislative determines–and takes political responsibility–for the moral choices 
the judiciary used to make. The judge may still enter into a kind of balancing, 
but the major outline of the equality approach in private relations is set by the 
legislative. 
 This solution is not entirely unknown to the German legal system. At a 
lower level of norms, the issue comes up in labor law around the employers’ 
obligation to treat all workers equally (arbeitsrechtliche Gleichbehandlungs-
grundsatz).68 Whereas previously equal treatment has been justified by the 
community bonds between employer and employees, modern reasoning is closer 
to the roots of non-discrimination law. According to the more recent theory, 
  
 66 Loenen, T.–Rodrigues, P. R. (Eds.): Non-discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives. 
The Hague, 1999. 
 67 Pierroth–Schlink: op. cit. 430. 
 68 Schiek, D.: Torn between Arithmetic and Substantive Equality? Perspectives on 
Equality in German Labour Law. The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations, 2002. 153–154.; Schiek, D.: Differenzierte Gerechtigkeit: Dis-
kriminierungsschutz und Vertragsrecht. Baden-Baden, 2000. 
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the contractual employment relationship is typically long-term, in many cases 
the parties conclude the contract for indefinite time. Since it is impossible to 
regulate all kinds of possible future disputes in a casuistic way, at least the 
basic principles have to be set. “If there is some collective order, it is held that 
this order must correspond to a standard of equality to be just.”69 It seems that 
this theory mirrors a social contract theory applying it to a smaller community.  
 As Susanne Baer showed it, “Whenever freedom is not seen in an isolated 
way, but in relation to other basic rights, one inevitably comes to the conclusion 
that no basic rights can grant empowerment for the discriminatory use of 
freedom. The unity of the constitution commands rather to make freedom in 
equality possible, as a realization of human dignity.”70 It should be admitted 
that freedom is only freedom of those who are treated equally.71 Disabled, who 
have no chance to access buildings so as to participate at a job interview, just 
like foreigners not served in restaurants, or potential tenants with dark skin 
colors have solely theoretical, but no real freedom of contract. The full reali-
zation of equality understood this way is a costly means of realizing non-
discrimination. As people are inherently different, equal freedom will never be 
achieved, but the starting points could be equalized. However, ensuring even 
this understanding of equality may be burdensome in two ways. First, the 
realization of equality in the access to goods and services may drive a seller 
out of the market, if majority customers punish him for his non-discriminating 
behavior. If however the principle of non-discrimination extends to all sellers 
and service providers, the racist/sexist/etc. consumers will have no chance to 
boycott non-discriminating companies.72 Second, direct costs occur when it 
  
 69 Schiek: Torn between Arithmetic and Substantive Equality? op. cit. 153–156. 
 70 “Wer Freiheit nicht isoliert, sondern im Zusammenhang mit anderen Grundrechten 
denkt, kommt zwangsläufig zu dem Schluss, dass kein Grundrecht dazu ermächtigen kann, 
Freiheit diskriminierend zu nutzen. Die Einheit der Verfassung gebietet es vielmehr, 
Freiheit in Gleichheit als Verwirklichung der Menschenwürde zu ermöglichen.” Baer, S.: 
‘Ende der Privatautonomie’ oder grundrechtlich fundierte Rechtsetzung? Zur deutschen 
Debatte um Antidiskriminierungsrecht, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, 2002. 290–294. 
 71 Schöbener–Stork: op. cit. 61., also shared by Winkler in Winkler: op. cit. 
paragraph 10. 
 72 At a different level, the equalization of starting points had also been considered at 
the beginning of European integration. Article 141 EC Treaty (ex Article 119) states the 
principle of equal pay for equal work irrespective of gender. This is the oldest non-
discrimination principle of EC law, which has been inserted into the Treaty of Rome upon 
the initiation of the French. France feared that its laws on equal pay for men and women will 
put them at a competitive disadvantage. If however all member States comply with the 
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comes to accommodation, be it the accommodation of religion or disability. 
The issue of allocation of these costs among the state, private parties and the 
disabled persons themselves shall be addressed. 
 Coming back to the anti-discrimination legislation, the first version of the 
extensive law implementing the relevant EU Directives received many criticisms 
and resulted in harsh opposition. It has been argued on the theoretical level that 
freedom-based systems are necessarily inherently discriminatory, and exception 
to freedom can only be granted to this in case of serious grievances, like in 
case of contracts that are against the public order. This problem however is 
said to be solved through the general clauses of the BGB.73  
 The solution of the modified bill can be regarded as a compromise. Total 
prohibition of discrimination applies only for “mass businesses” (“Massen-
geschäfte“). A special issue dominating the discussion in Germany is whether 
landlords may discriminate when renting a flat or a room. Again a compromise 
has been reached. Whenever a house, flat or room is to be rented or sold where 
the owner him- or herself is also living, one cannot speak of an offer to the 
public. Renting a room to someone with whom the landlord will live together 
or selling a part of the seller’s house if he or she is going to stay in the other 
part of the building involves a part of private life, where law cannot enter.74  
 Some referred to freedom of contract as follows from the free development of 
personality laid down in Article 2 Section (1) Basic Law. It is however contested 
whether national basic rights as laid down in the domestic constitution, serve as 
a proper test for the limits of implementation of an EU law.  
 
 
5. Legal Consequences of Non-Implementation 
 
The European Commission filed a suit with the ECJ against Germany for the 
non-implementation of the Race and Framework Directives. The ECJ declared 
in its decisions C-329/04 of April 28, 2005 and C-43/05 of February 23, 2006 
that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, the laws necessary to 
comply with the Race and Framework Directives, Germany has failed to fulfill 
its obligations under EC law.  
                                                      
principle, France will not suffer such detriments. Barnard, C.: EC Employment Law, Oxford, 
2000. 198. 
 73 Picker: op. cit. 771–784, 782. 
 74 Schöbener–Stork: op. cit. 77. 
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 According to the principle of supremacy of EU law, the acquis com-
munautaire has primacy over the national law of the Member States. The 
principle „lex posterior derogat lege priori” does not apply in case of a conflict 
between the acquis and national law, since it would undermine EU law. Although 
there is no Treaty reference to this principle,75 the answer is clear, the primacy 
of EU law has been established by the early case-law of the European Court of 
Justice.76 The ECJ reestablished the principle of supremacy of Community law, 
and held that the only court that can invalidate EU laws is the ECJ.77 In relation 
to the non-implemented Directive the question emerges whether German courts 
or parties can rely directly on the Directives in lack of an implementing 
national law, i.e. whether a person who feels to have been discriminated 
against may invoke the Directive directly, if a Member State has not (or not 
fully) implemented it.  
 There are major differences as to the direct effect of Treaty provisions, 
Regulations and Directives. Whereas primary sources of Community law and 
Regulations can be relied on directly in national proceedings, the situation of 
Directives is more complicated. Following from the nature of the Directive, as 
opposed to Regulations and decisions, the EC Treaty in its Article 249 
prescribes for national implementation of Directives. Directives are the main 
„instruments of harmonization”78, they are binding as the result to be achieved, 
however the form and choice of methods to achieve the objective are left to 
Member States.  
 The criteria of direct effect of Directives has been established by the case-
law of the ECJ. The first is a general rule: any part of the acquis communautaire 
can only be relied on directly, if it is clear, precise and unconditional.79 
Following from their nature, Directives are not that detailed and precise, often 
the ambiguous language is the result of a political compromise, and national 
peculiarities can be taken into account in the process of implementation. In the 
  
 75 In the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union this question would be solved. 
Article I–10 Section (1) of the draft Treaty by codifying existing case-law provides that the 
“Constitution, and law made by the Union’s Institutions in exercising competences conferred 
on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States”. 
 76 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3, Case 
6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 1141. 
 77 For further discussion about the supremacy doctrine, see Craig, P.–De Búrca, G.: EU 
Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, 2003. 275–316. 
 78 Craig–De Búrca: op. cit.  202. 
 79 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3, Case 
6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 1141. 
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lead case, Van Duyn, the ECJ held that Directives are binding, as to their effet 
utile, i.e. their useful effect.80 In this way Member States have been precluded 
from relying on the non-implementation of a Directive in cases initiated 
according to them by individuals.  
 Second, in case of Directives, the date for implementation must have been 
passed. Nevertheless, according to the ECJ’s settled case-law, during the period 
of implementation of a Directive, Member States must refrain from taking 
measures that are likely hamper the attainment of the result to be achieved by 
the Directive.  
 In the case Mangold81 the ECJ held that in relation to the compliance with 
the Framework Directive that it was „the responsibility of the national court to 
guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimination 
in respect of age, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict 
with Community law, even where the period prescribed for transposition of 
that directive has not yet expired.” 
 Third, Directives, unlike Treaty provisions and Regulations only have 
vertical direct effect, i.e. they can only be invoked against public entities. The 
reason for this limitation is that Directives are addressed to the Member States, 
which are required to implement them into national laws. Since private 
individuals do not participate or influence that process, it would be unjust to 
make them responsible for non-implementation of EU Directives. It should 
however be mentioned that the ECJ has been very generous with the determi-
nation of what entity amounts to a public body.82 Furthermore, it established 
the principle of indirect effect. According to the Von Colson principle, domestic 
courts are obliged to interpret all national laws in the light of the Directives.83  
 Another way victims can make use of the Directive is to invoke the concept 
of state liability. In case the state's breach of EC law is sufficiently serious, 
pecuniary compensation can be claimed. The fact that someone asks for 
compensation does not preclude him or her from relying on the vertical direct 
effect at the same time. The test for state liability and damages has been phrased 
  
 80 Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
 81 C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. Reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Labor Court of München. 
 82 E.g. Case C-188/89 A. Foster and Others v British Gas plc Office [1990] ECR I-
3313, where British Gas was regarded as a public entity due to state influence.  
 83 Case C-14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 
1891. 
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in the in the Francovich case.84 The ECJ first established a test for making 
Member States liable for failure to implement Directives and in later cases 
refined the requirements. 
 Recently the Berlin Labor Court in a decision of July 13, 200585 relied on 
the Framework Directive in the case of a disabled applicant who has been 
rejected by the Berlin police. She received a compensation amounting to a gross 
six-month-salary at the police. Although she satisfied all criteria necessary and 
prescribed for the job of supervising parking lots, she has not been employed 
solely because she had a disability the degree of which was 40%. Although 
the applicant suffered from serious neurodermitis, she could work previous to 
her application to the police without any difficulties, and she has not been sick 
for a single day for the last 8 years before she applied for the job. Since her 
disability did not reach 50%, and she has not been granted equal status to 
severely disabled persons, she was not covered by the respective provisions of 
the Social Code.86 Since the police is a public, state employer, the Berlin court 
invoked directly the respective provisions of the Framework Directive.  
 
 
6. Conclusion and Predictions on the Future of German Anti-
Discrimination Legislation 
 
A few days before the present essay has been submitted, the German legislator 
adopted the long-awaited the General Equal Treatment Act, the anti-discrimi-
nation law transposing the EU ‘s equality Directives. The delay in the adoption 
of the domestic law and the failures of the several drafts were subject to hot 
debates in the last more than two years. 
 Susanne Baer explains the failure of the previous anti-discrimination drfats 
pessimistically by the general attitude of the majority of German citizens. She 
explains the “dissonance of the Germans in the European orchestra”87 with 
the racist and anti-Semitic attitude of most members of society. Indeed, as the 
Eurobarometer studies show,88 Germans’ resistance to multicultural society, 
  
 84 Cases C-6 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
 85 86 Ca 24168/04, NZA-RR 2005, 608. 
 86 Article 81 Section (2) SGB IX. 
 87 Baer: op. cit. 
 88 Coenders, M., Lubbers, M. and Scheeper, P.: Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities 
in European Union Member States, Results from the Standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-
 PETRA BÁRD 
  
 
300 
opposition to civil rights, favoring the repatriation of migrants, is beyond the 
average. Both East and West-Germans’ attitudes are the second or third most 
negative from among the pre-2004-enlargement Member States towards 
minorities, depending on the specific minority-related question.  
 I believe the reasons for the lengthy non-implementation of the EU anti-
discrimination Directives are multi-layered. The question is not whether private 
autonomy may be limited or not, but the extent to which restriction is permitted 
is at stake.89 Equality is a long adopted value by the German legal system and 
also by society. The principle of equality is not questioned, rather the version of 
substantive equality is searched that is reconcilable with market considerations. 
A growing tendency against minorities at societal level is one side of the coin, 
which is coupled by the fact that German legal theory and tradition extensively 
elaborated on the concept of third party effect and non-discrimination, so the 
German drafters took the law implementing the EU Directives seriously.  
 With a sincere discourse law can change social conceptions more efficiently. 
Those discriminating either maliciously or without ill will are not faced with 
these ideas first when the law sanctions them, but can actively participate in 
the debate and express, develop their views on the matter. Law shapes social 
constructions not only in the field of equality, but also contractual freedom 
would be unthinkable without the legally constructed concept of contract. Law 
has an effect on all citizens irrespectively of whether they know the relevant 
provisions of the BGB or not. Similarly, equality legislation may add to people’s 
general understanding of non-discrimination. In this sense the debate that 
evolved around the implementing law is certainly beneficial. 
 In the German literature sexual orientation, and religion are often mentioned 
as problematic grounds for non-discrimination in private relation; in contrast 
disability discrimination and its profit-diminishing aspects are mentioned 
surprisingly rarely. The reason is most probably that the Framework Directive 
does not specify a number of concepts: For example the definition of 
disability, sanctions for non-compliance are left to the Member States.90 
Therefore the realization of disability rights mainly depends on the Member 
                                                      
2003, Report 2 for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Ref. no. 
2003/04/01, http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/material/pub/eurobarometer/EB2005/Report-2.pdf 
 89 This is in line with Winkler’s remark on the Basic Law: „I cannot see that there is a 
virgin part of the Constitution in which any kind of unbound, immaculate freedom would 
rule.” Winkler: op. cit. paragraph 8. 
 90 The responsibility of Member States has been reinforced in the Case C-13/05 Sonia 
Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA of July 11, 2006 in effect leaving the definition 
of disability up to the Member States.  
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States themselves. As it has been shown, the German government did not only 
intend to implement the EU pieces of law, but wanted to give a way broader 
protection to traditionally discriminated groups than the Directives prescribed. 
This approach although benevolent, had theoretical and practical mistakes. 
Theoretically, it did not take sufficiently account of the fact that there are different 
reasons behind discrimination of individuals with diverse characteristics that 
serve as the basis of protected grounds.91 It is certainly problematic to regulate 
the different kinds of mental, physical, psychological impairments together in 
one instrument, but it is almost impossible to regulate disability together with 
race, ethnicity, age, sex, sexual orientation, religion and belief, if detailed rules 
are to be laid down.92 Such a common regulation is only imaginable in the form 
of a single constitutional equality provision, or an EU Directive setting only the 
objectives and the framework for national legislation. These are sufficiently 
broad and vague rules for a joint regulation of the different kinds of protected 
grounds. However, once the details are to be set, it is more advisable to regulate 
them separately. The practical side of the problem is that a law giving an 
overbroad protection to persons with diverse characteristics can hardly enjoy 
the support of all parties adhering to different ideologies. The lack of political 
consensus led to the fall of the previous draft laws or at least to the Act’s 
hibernation for years. The fact that Germany wanted “to be more ‘European’ than 
‘Europe’”93 was not only detrimental to the persons belonging to the groups the 
anti-discrimination law intended to protect, but Germany was also in violation 
of EU law for more than two years. At a more positive note however the 
German legal philosophical and political controversy can serve as an example 
for Member States which either complied with EU laws without any further 
legal debate and civil dialogue or even worse, translated the Directives into 
their official languages and promulgated it in the form of a national piece of 
legislation. 
 
  
 91 In the German context, three reasons have been differentiated and an economic case 
has been advocated for anti-discrimination rules in private law by Engert in: Engert, A.: 
Allied by Surprise? The Economic Case For an Anti-Discrimination Statute. German Law 
Journal, 2003. 
 92 This view has also been shared by among others Mahlmann: op. cit. 1045. 
 93 Picker: op. cit. 771–784, 775. 
